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Abstract: The relationships among competition in the financial sector, access of firms to 
external financing, and associated economic growth are ambiguous in theory.  Moreover, 
measuring competition in the financial sector can be complex.  In this paper we first estimate for 
16 countries a measure of banking system competition based on industrial organization theory.  
We then relate this competition measure to growth of industries and find that greater competition 
in countries’ banking systems allows financially dependent industries to grow faster.  These 
results are robust under a variety of tests.  Our results suggest that the degree of competition is an 
important aspect of financial sector functioning. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, a large number of papers have established that greater financial development 
fosters growth and that financial development is related to a country’s institutional 
characteristics, including its legal framework (the literature is reviewed in Levine 2004).  The 
financial development and growth literature has established that finance matters for growth both 
at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels (King and Levine 1993).  The law and finance 
literature has found that financial markets are better developed in countries with strong legal 
frameworks (La Porta et al. 1998; Beck et al. 2003).  Well-developed financial markets in turn 
make it easier for firms to attract financing for their investment needs (Rajan and Zingales 1998).  
 
Thus far this literature has not paid much attention to competition in the financial sector, 
although such competition matters for a number of reasons.  As in other industries, the degree of 
competition in the financial sector can affect the efficiency of the production of services, the 
quality of products, and the degree of innovation in that sector.  Specific to the financial sector is 
the link between competition and stability that has long been recognized in theoretical and 
empirical research (see Allen and Gale (2004) for a review) and, most importantly, in the actual 
conduct of prudential policy toward banks.  Also important, it has been shown theoretically that 
the degree of competition in the financial sector can affect the access of firms to external 
financing (see Vives (2001) for a review).  The direction of this relationship, however, is unclear.  
Less competitive systems may lead to easier access to external financing because, with more 
market power, banks are more inclined to invest in information acquisition and relationships with 
borrowers.  However, when banking systems are less competitive, hold-up problems may lead   3
borrowers to be less willing to enter such relationships, thereby lowering the effective demand 
for external financing.  Furthermore, less-competitive banking systems can be more costly and 
exhibit a lower quality of services, thereby lowering the effective demand for external financing 
and thus encouraging less growth.  These effects may further vary by the degree of competition 
in the country’s overall financial sector; for example, the degree of hold-up problems in the 
system may vary with the availability of financing options outside of the banking system (e.g., 
from capital markets). 
 
Although some of the relationships between competition and banking system performance 
have been analyzed in the theoretical literature and even empirically in some country studies, 
cross-country empirical research has so far mainly investigated the effects of regulations and 
specific structural or other factors on banking performance.  For example, in a broad survey of 
rules governing banking systems, Barth et al. (2001) document for 107 countries various 
regulatory restrictions that were in place in 1999 on commercial banks, including various entry 
and exit restrictions and practices.  Using this data, Barth et al. (2003) document (among other 
things) that tighter entry requirements are negatively linked with bank efficiency, leading to 
higher interest-rate margins and overhead expenditures, and that restricting foreign bank 
participation tends to increase bank fragility.  There have also been a number of recent cross-
country studies on the effects of the structure of banking systems on financial sector stability, 
access to financing, and growth (see Berger et al. (2004) for a review).  For example, Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2004) investigate the effects of regulations, market structure, and institutions on the 
cost of financial intermediation.   
   4
Cross-country research on the effects of competition in banking systems is still at an early 
stage, however.  The interpretation of the existing empirical work using measures of regulations, 
market structure, and institutions is not always clear because some theoretical issues have not 
always been taken into account.  In particular, the long-existing theory of industrial organization 
has shown that the competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured by market structure 
indicators alone (such as the number of institutions, Herfindahl or other concentration indexes, or 
ownership structure, such as the degree of foreign or state ownership).  Rather, establishing the 
degree of effective competition requires a structural model.  To date, however, most papers have 
not investigated the degree of competition in the banking system using a specific structural 
model.  Hence, their results concerning the effect of market structure on banking system 
performance, firm financing, and growth could reflect factors other than competition.   
 
A more industrial organization-based approach to assessing the degree of competition in the 
financial sector allows us to overcome the concerns raised by the contestability literature.  An 
additional measure will also allow a comparison of results to approaches using banking system 
structures.  In a previous paper (Claessens and Laeven 2004), we applied such a structural 
competition test to 50 countries’ banking systems and documented this measure of competition 
for a large cross-section of countries.  In addition, we investigated how market structure, entry 
and activity regulations, and the presence of foreign banks affected the competitive conditions of 
banking systems.  We did not, however, investigate the relationship of this competition measure 
to growth or other economic variables. 
   5
One manner of clarifying the theoretically ambiguous relationships between banking system 
competition and the provision of external financing is to investigate how the degree of 
competition affects the growth of firms that vary in their dependence on external financing.  This 
can be done using the empirical setup developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998; hereafter RZ).  
Using sectoral growth data for a large sample of countries, RZ assess the relationship between 
financial development and growth in value added of sectors that vary in their external financial 
dependence.  The methodology of RZ has been adapted in a number of ways to assess the impact 
on industrial growth of banking system concentration, the development of trade finance, and the 
strength of property rights.
1  This paper further adapts the methodology to explore the 
relationships between banking system competition and growth.   
 
We find that our competitiveness measure is positively associated with countries’ industrial 
growth, suggesting that more competitive banking systems are better at providing financing to 
financially dependent firms.  We find no evidence that market structure—that is, concentration 
in the banking system—helps predict industrial sector growth.  Thus, the view that market 
power in banking is good for firm access to financing finds no support.  Rather, there is support 
for the view that more competition may reduce hold-up problems and lower the costs of 
financial intermediation, making financially dependent firms more willing to seek (and more 
able to obtain) external financing.  These effects are robust to a number of sensitivity tests 
using different measures of financial sector development, different time periods and 
                                                 
1 Other papers that use this approach include, among others: Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), which investigates the 
effects of bank concentration on sectoral growth; Fisman and Love (2003), which investigates the effects of trade 
credit usage on sectoral growth; and Claessens and Laeven (2003), which investigates the role of property rights in 
growth.   6
instrumental variables techniques, and controlling for the degree of growth opportunities facing 
industries.         
  
The results, however, still come with some caveats.  It could be that some market power 
increases financial stability and thereby influences industrial growth positively over long 
periods.  This effect is not necessarily captured in our analysis, since the sample we use is 
relatively short.  Furthermore, although we conducted a number of robustness tests, we did not 
control for all factors that have been found to affect financial sector development and 
functioning; our competition measure may unwittingly capture these other factors.  Still, the 
results suggest that competition is an aspect of overall financial system functioning that is well 
worth analyzing. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of the theory and related 
empirical, cross-country literature on the effects of competition in the financial sector on growth.  
It also reviews the methodology used to measure the degree of competition in the banking 
market of a particular country, provides references to existing studies using this measure, and 
provides the empirical setup we use for the growth regressions.  In Section 3, the data are 
presented.  The main empirical results regarding banking system competition and industrial 
growth are provided in Section 4, and robustness tests are presented in Section 5.  Our 
conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
   7
2.   LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY  
 
We are interested in studying the effects of banking system competition on economic 
growth. Specifically, we would like to know whether industrial sectors that typically use more 
external financing grow faster in countries with more competition in their banking systems.   
Theoretical work suggests an ambiguous relationship between the degree of banking system 
competition and firm access to external financing and, in turn, firm growth.  On one hand, more 
competitive banking systems may channel less financing to firms because they have less of an 
incentive to invest in close relationships with firms (Rajan 1992; Petersen and Rajan 1995).  As a 
consequence, especially those firms and sectors that are heavily dependent on external financing 
should grow more slowly in systems that are more competitive.  On the other hand, a hold-up 
problem can arise under close relationships because borrowers cannot easily break from a 
lending relationship without providing an adverse signal of their own quality.  Theoretical work 
has suggested that such hold-up problems occur less often in more competitive financial systems 
and, for that reason, firms may be more willing to enter close relationships with a bank under 
more competition (Boot and Thakor 2000).  Conversely, with more competition, firms—
especially those heavily dependent on external financing should grow faster.  Additionally, it is 
likely (as in other industries) that, under more competition, a financial system provides a broader 
range of better-quality financial services at lower costs and in that way improves industrial 
growth; again, this is especially true for financially dependent firms.  
 
To date, there have been only a few cross-country papers studying the impact of banking 
system structure on growth.  One test of whether more banking system competition positively   8
affects firms’ ability to attract financing— and, through that channel, growth— is to investigate 
if external financially dependent sectors grow faster in countries with greater competition. 
Building on the empirical methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the cross-sectional study 
of Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) documents that banking sector concentration exerts a 
depressing effect on overall economic growth even as it promotes the growth of industries that 
depend heavily on external finance.  Using the same data and similar methodology, Deidda and 
Fattouh (2002) find that banking concentration is negatively associated with per capita growth 
and industrial growth only in low-income countries, while there is no significant relationship 
between banking concentration and growth in high-income countries.  Dell’Ariccia and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2004) also employ this approach and find that banking system concentration 
has a positive effect on firm creation.  They also find, however, that the degree of information 
asymmetries in the country limits the overall positive effects of banking system concentration on 
firm credit, which is consistent with theories claiming that concentration may reduce credit to 
informationally opaque firms.  Cetorelli (2001) also uses this methodology and finds that 
banking concentration enhances industry concentration, especially in sectors highly dependent 
on external finance, although these effects are stronger in countries with less-developed financial 
systems.  
 
Thus, although existing empirical work has shown some relationships between market 
structure and growth, the link from market structure to degree of competition is not clear—as 
highlighted by the general contestability literature (Baumol et al. 1982). Specifically, measures 
such as banking system concentration do not necessarily capture the degree of effective 
competition, which actually depends on the contestability of the system.  An industrial   9
organization-based approach to assessing the degree of competition in the financial sector allows 
one to overcome these concerns.  The Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology provides such a 
theoretically better-supported measure of competition, a model that has also been used to 
estimate the competitiveness of banking industries.  We will now provide more detail on this 
competition measure and accompanying estimation techniques.  Following this, we dicuss some 
other studies that have used this methodology and present, in detail, the technique for estimating 
the relationship between growth and this competition measure. 
 
The methodology of Rosse and Panzar (1977)—as expanded by Panzar and Rosse (1982) 
and Panzar and Rosse (1987), and hereafter denoted PR—uses data at the firm (or bank) level.  It 
investigates the extent to which a change in factor input prices is reflected in (equilibrium) 
revenues earned by a specific bank. Specifically, the PR H-statistic is calculated using reduced- 
form bank revenue equations and measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of the 
bank with respect to the bank’s input prices.  The reduced-form revenue equation to be estimated 
for each banking system is as follows: 
 
, ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( , 3 3 , 2 2 , 1 1 , 2 2 , 1 1 it it it it it it t i it Y Y Y W W T P ε γ γ γ β β α + + + + + + + =  (1) 
 
where the subscript i denotes bank i and the subscript t, year t.  In terms of variables, it P  is the 
ratio of total revenue to total assets (including both gross interest revenues and noninterest 
income), αi are bank fixed effects, Tt are time dummies,  it W , 1  is the ratio of interest expenses to 
total deposits and money market funding (proxy for input price of deposits), and  it W , 2  is the ratio 
of overhead expenses to total assets.  The Yi,t variables are bank-specific controls.  The H-statistic   10
equals 2 1 β β + = H .  Under perfect competition, an increase in input prices raises both marginal 
costs and total revenues by the same amount as the rise in costs.  Under a monopoly, an increase 
in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output, and (as a result) reduce 
total revenues.
2  T h e  P R  H-statistic can thus be interpreted as follows:  H<0 indicates a 
monopoly; H=1 indicates perfect competition; and 0<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition.
3    
 
A number of papers have applied the PR methodology to the issue of competition in the 
financial sector, although mostly to the banking system specifically.
4  Shaffer (1982) was one of 
the first to apply the PR model to banks.  He estimated it for New York banks using data for 
1979 and found monopolistic competition.  Nathan and Neave (1989) study Canadian banks. 
Others have studied some non—North American and non-European banking systems.  In Japan, 
for example, Molyneux et al. (1996) find evidence of a monopoly situation in 1986—1988.  A 
number of papers have studied European banking systems.
5  Although the findings are somewhat 
varied, the papers generally reject both perfect collusion and perfect competition, finding mostly 
evidence of monopolistic competition (Bikker and Haaf (2001) summarize the results of ten such 
                                                 
2 This interpretation assumes that the test is undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium.  Therefore, 
we also tested whether the observations were in long-run equilibrium and found the tests to be satisfied.  Given the 
short time period, we did not allow for any time variation in the H-measure.  Arguably, however, liberalization and 
deregulation during this period has affected the degree of competition in many banking systems over time.  To the 
extent that these have been trends affecting banking systems globally in the same way and have preserved the 
ranking of competitiveness among countries, there will be no bias in our tests from using a constant H-measure.  
Nevertheless, we did conduct tests regarding the assumption of stability in the competition measure over time (see 
footnote 11). 
3It can be shown that, if the bank faces a demand with constant elasticity and a Cobb—Douglas technology, then the 
magnitude of H can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of monopoly power or, alternatively (as in 
Claessens and Laeven 2004), as a measure of the degree of competition.   
4 Cetorelli (1999) provides more detail on these formal tests and reviews some of the results of previous studies of 
empirical banking studies. 
5 These papers include Molyneux et al. (1994), Vesala (1995), Coccorese (1998), De Bandt and Davis (2000), and 
Hempel (2002).  The countries covered, the time periods, and some of the assumptions used vary among the studies.     11
studies).  Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), for example, find monopolistic competition in all of the 
15 EU countries they study.   
 
To date, tests are few on the competitiveness of banking systems for developing countries 
and transition economies using these models, but studies again find mostly evidence of 
monopolistic competition.  Belaisch (2003) finds evidence of a nonmonopolistic market structure 
in Brazil.  Gelos and Roldos (2002) analyze a number of banking markets, including some 
developing countries.  They report that, overall, banking markets in their sample of eight 
European and Latin American countries have not become less competitive, although 
concentration has increased. They conclude that lowered barriers to entry, such as allowing 
increased entry by foreign banks, appear to have prevented a decline in competitive pressures 
associated with consolidation. Levy Yeyati and Micco (2003) find similar results for their sample 
of Latin America countries and also find that the consolidation in the 1990s may have, if 
anything, led to more rather than less competition.  Philippatos and Yildirim (2002) investigate 
fourteen Central and Eastern European banking systems and find (except for Latvia, Macedonia, 
and Lithuania) that these banking systems cannot be characterized either as perfectly competitive 
or as perfectly monopolistic. 
 
When studying the effects of banking system competition on growth, we need—besides a 
good measure of effective competition— to control for other country circumstances that may be 
correlated with competition but that, in effect, may determine the growth effects.  Otherwise, the 
incorrect conclusion that competition is (or is not) important could be reached.  There are several 
possible approaches to controlling for other country conditions, but the setup of Rajan and   12
Zingales (1998; hereafter RZ), which has been used in a number of tests, is innovative and very 
much applicable for our empirical tests on the effects of competition in the banking system on 
economic growth in terms of the degree of access to external financing.  Next, we provide more 
detail on the RZ approach. 
 
The RZ model relates the growth in real value added in a sector in a particular country to 
a number of country- and industry-specific variables.  In the case of RZ, the specific test focuses 
on financial development.  The question of RZ is whether financially dependent firms can be 
expected to grow more in countries with a higher level of financial development.  The authors 
use U.S. firm data as proxy at the industry level to derive the typical external financial 
dependence for a particular industrial sector.  Their presumption is that the well-developed 
financial markets in the United States should allow U.S. firms to achieve the desired financing 
for their respective industrial sector.  This offers a way of identifying the degree to which 
industries desire external financing anywhere in the world.
6  The innovation of the RZ approach 
is in positioning an interaction between a country characteristic (its financial development) and 
this (benchmark) external financial dependence of a given industry.  It then investigates how 
industrial growth relates to this interaction term, thereby investigating whether industrial sectors 
that typically use more external financing grow faster in countries with greater financial sector 
development.  This overcomes some of the identification problems encountered in standard 
cross-country growth regressions.  The approach is also less subject to criticism regarding an 
                                                 
6 The advantage of this approach is that one does not need information on the actual external financing dependence 
for industries in different countries. The comparability of such data would be reduced because accounting practices 
differ around the world.  It does assume that there are technological and economic reasons why some industries 
depend more on external finance than do others, and that these differences, to a large degree, prevail across 
countries. This does not mean that the model assumes a sector in two countries with the same degree of financial 
development to have exactly the same optimal external financing structures. Local conditions, such as growth 
opportunities, are allowed to differ between countries. The model assumes only that the rank order of optimal 
external financing needs across industries is similar across countries.   13
“omitted variable” bias or model specification than are traditional approaches that relate financial 
sector development directly to economic growth, even when considering other country 
characteristics.  In the regression results explaining sectoral growth, RZ find a positive sign for 
the interaction between the external financial dependence ratio and the level of financial 
development, thus demonstrating a positive impact of financial development on growth due to 
greater availability of external financing. 
 
We expand the RZ model, as others have done, to test for the effect of competition in the 
banking system on growth and the specific channels through which competition may affect 
growth.  Specifically, we add to the RZ model our H-measure of the degree of competition in the 
country’s banking system as a term that interacts with the sectoral measure of financial 
dependence.  Using the interaction variable between each industrial sector’s external financing 
dependence and the index of the degree of competition in the country’s banking system, we test 
whether industrial sectors that typically require more external financing grow faster in countries 
with more competition in their banking systems.  To allow for comparisons with RZ and to 
control for the effects of financial sector development on growth, in most regressions we also 
include financial dependence interacted with financial development.   
 
In order to control for differences in growth potential across industries, in their 
regressions, RZ also include the industry’s market share in total manufacturing in the specific 
country.  Industries with large shares in value added may have less growth potential than 
industries with small initial shares when there is an industry-specific convergence effect.  The 
initial share may also help to control for other variations between countries, such as in their   14
initial comparative advantage among certain industries based on factors other than financial 
development and banking system competition; RZ also use country and industry dummies to 
control for any remaining country-specific and industry-specific factors.  We do likewise and end 
up with the following specification: 
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where each industry is indicated by index j and each country by index k.  Greek letters in bold 
indicate vectors of coefficients, indexed by industry j or country k.  Growth is the average annual 
real growth rate of value added in industry j in country k.  
 
With these specifications, some of our regressions are similar to those of Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001), Deidda and Fattouh (2002), and Dell’Ariccia and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2004), 
except that they all use banking sector concentration instead of our measure of bank competition.  
To allow for direct comparisons, we also run the regressions with the banking sector 
concentration measure used by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001; henceforth CG), again interacted 
with financial dependence, instead of the competition measure.  Although both the competition 
and the concentration measure refer to the banking system, the two can capture quite different 
aspects.  Claessens and Laeven (2004; henceforth CL) related their estimated H-measure of 
competitiveness for 50 countries to the countries’ structural and regulatory indicators.  Contrary 
to the assumption maintained in much of the literature that more concentrated banking systems 
(2)   15
are less competitive, they did not find any evidence that banking system concentration is 
negatively related to the H-measure.  In fact, CL found some evidence that more-concentrated 
banking systems are more competitive.  Their H-statistic estimates, for example suggest that 
some countries with highly concentrated banking markets, such as the Netherlands, have very 
competitive banking systems.  They also found that systems with greater foreign bank entry and 
lack of restrictions on entry and activity have a higher competitiveness score.  Thus, it can be 




3.   DATA 
 
We use industry-specific and country-specific data from a variety of sources.  Table 1 
presents an overview of the variables used in our empirical analysis together with their sources.  
Most of the variables are self-explanatory and have been used by RZ or CG.  For our dependent 
variable, growth in value added, we have data on value added from the UNIDO database (United 
Nations Database on Industrial Statistics).  For most regressions, we use the growth in value 
added over the period 1980—1990 (as RZ do).  We also have figures for growth in value added 
for the period 1980—1997, which we use as a robustness test.  We always use the average rates 
of growth over the period under study. 
 
As a measure of external financial dependence at the sectoral level, we use the data from 
RZ,  who assume that the external financing ratio for each industry in the United States   16
constitutes a global benchmark of each sector’s need for external financing.  The authors 
calculate the external financial dependence ratios by industry using Compustat data on U.S. 
firms for the years 1980 to 1989.  We simply use their data for this measure.   
 





Growth  Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector in a particular country 
over the period 1980 to 1990. The sectors are classified on the basis of ISIC. Source: Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). Original source: United Nations Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Growth8097  Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector in a particular country 
over the period 1980 to 1997, if available. The sectors are classified on the basis of ISIC. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the United Nations Database on 
Industrial Statistics. 
Share in value added  Fraction of ISIC sector in value added of total manufacturing sector in 1980. Source: Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). 
Financial dependence  External financial dependence of U.S. firms by ISIC sector averaged over the period 1980 
to 1989. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Private credit  Private credit divided by GDP in 1980. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Market cap  Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in 1980. Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Total capitalization  Sum of the private credit and stock market capitalization variables. 
Concentration  Measure of bank concentration. Sum of the market shares measured in total assets of the 
three largest banks for the period 1989 to 1996, when available. Source: Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001).  
Competition  Measure of bank competition. Average H-statistic for the period 1987—1996. Source: 
Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope and following the methodology in 
Claessens and Laeven (2004). 
Accounting  Measure of accounting standards in the country in 1983. Source: Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). 
Property rights  Measure of property rights. Median value over 1995—99; score from 1 to 5. A higher score 
denotes greater protection of property. Source: Heritage Foundation. 
GDP per capita  The logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980. Source: World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank.  
Legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country. There 
are four possible origins: (1) English common law; (2) French commercial code; (3) 
German commercial code; and (4) Scandinavian commercial code. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
 
Note: This table describes the variables collected for our study. The first column gives the names of the variable as 
we use it; the second column describes the variable and provides the source from which it was collected.   17
            Also in line with RZ, we use as proxies for countries’ financial development the 
following variable:  first, the ratio of total capitalization to GDP, with total capitalization defined 
as the sum of domestic credit to private sector (as provided by the World Development 
Indicators) and stock market capitalization (as provided by the S&P, formerly IFC, Emerging 
Markets Database).
7  Although we mostly use total capitalization to GDP, we also study 
separately the two subcomponents, private credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to 
GDP.  Furthermore, as RZ did, we use the quality of the country’s accounting standards as 
provided by CIFAR (Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research) as a measure of 
financial sector development.  The financial development measures apply to the beginning of our 
sample (1980) and the accounting standards measure to 1983, the earliest period for which the 
index on accounting standards is available (we also used 1990 data and found similar results).   
 
As our measure of the degree of competition in the banking system, we estimate the H-
measure using the PR methodology, just as CL did.   In CL the H-measure was estimated over 
the period 1994—2001, a period for which more individual bank data are available from 
Bankscope.  For our purposes,  the 1994—2001 period is less attractive because it does not 
overlap much with the period for which we measure the growth rate of value-added, 1980 to 
1990, or the period for which benchmark external financing needs are calculated, 1980 to 1989.  
Bankscope does not, however, cover a large enough sample of countries before 1987.  We also 
need to estimate the H-statistics over several years (we choose a period of ten years) to have 
                                                 
7 In RZ, total domestic credit to GDP is used as a measure of financial development; the authors refer to the sum of 
total domestic credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP as “total capitalization”. Here, we focus on 
domestic credit to the private sector and use “total capitalization” to denote the sum of private credit to GDP and 
stock market capitalization to GDP. We prefer to use private credit as the measure of banking sector development 
because it covers credit extended to the private sector and does not include credit extended to governments, 
government agencies, and public enterprises, as is typical of many other analyses (e.g., Beck et al. 2000). However, 
including credit to the public sector in the measure of total capitalization does not change our results.   18
enough observations (many countries have only a few banks).  Therefore, to estimate the degree 
of competition, we use the available data from Bankscope for the period 1987—1996, exploring 
the variation across banks and over time.  We do investigate, however, the stability of the 
competition measure over this period. 
 
When estimating H, we include several control variables at the individual bank level— 
specifically, the ratio of the bank’s equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total assets, and 
the logarithm of total assets (in order to control for potential size effects).  We estimate the 
model for each banking system using OLS with fixed bank-specific effects.  We also include 
time dummies for each banking market and exclude countries with fewer than 20 bank-year 
observations. As a consequence, our sample reduces to 20 countries.  We estimate H, and the 
standard deviation of H, and we check whether H is significantly different from 0 or 1. In all 
cases, statistically H is significantly different from 0 (at the 1% level).  Only the banking system 
in Netherlands has an H not statistically significantly different from 1 (perfect competition) at the 
1% level (Norway as well, but at the 5% level).  We also perform equilibrium tests and find most 
countries to be in equilibrium.
8  Alternatively, instead of the competition measure, we use data 
on the banking system concentration ratio (top three banks) of CG, in which case the 




                                                 
8 In this model, by replacing P (the total revenues to total asset ratio) by the pretax return on assets ratio and then 
running the same regressions, we can conduct equilibrium tests.  We found most countries to be in equilibrium, i.e., 
the competition measures H when using the pretax return on assets ratio as dependent variable is not significantly 
different from 0.  Appendix Table II provides standard deviations and significance tests of the individual H-
measures.   19
The dataset of RZ includes 42 countries.  When we merge it with the countries for which 
we estimate the competitiveness measure, the number of countries included in our dataset drops 
quite a bit; we are left with 17 countries.  For the growth regressions, as in RZ, we need to drop 
the benchmark country (the United States) and hence are left with 16 countries.  In all 
regressions, we use country dummies to control for country differences and use industry 
dummies to correct for industry-specific effects.   
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the country-specific variables (Appendix Table 
I presents the same statistics for growth, total capitalization, concentration, and competition— 
but by individual country).  The average sectoral real growth rate is 3.5%.  The average sector 
requires some 31% of external financing for its investments.  Total capitalization to GDP is on 
average some 38% but with large variations across countries, from a low of 75% to a high of 
219%.  The top-three banking concentration measure is on average 55% but also with significant 
variation, from a low of 21% (Japan) to a high of 87% (Jordan).  The average competitiveness 
measure is 0.72, with a low of 0.46 (Egypt) and a high of 1.0 (Netherlands), indicating that some 
form of monopolistic competition is most typical of the 16 banking systems. 
 




deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations
Growth 0.0349 0.0920 -0.4474 1.0000 1251
Share in value added  0.0156 0.0208 0.0000 0.2244 1297
Financial dependence  0.3136 0.3971 -0.4512 1.4915 1412
Total capitalization  0.5803 0.3889 0.0704 2.1903 1452
Concentration 0.5518 0.1797 0.2100 0.8700 1452
Competition 0.7181 0.1449 0.4615 1.0123 575
 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of the main regression variables. Definitions and data sources of the 
variables are in Table 1. 
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Table 3 is a correlation matrix whose statistics show that there are some important 
correlations among the variables.  Growth in value added is negatively correlated with the share 
in value added, indicating a convergence effect whereby industries with a large share in value 
grow more slowly.  As shown in previous work, there is a positive correlation between growth in 
value added and the degree of financial sector development.  Noteworthy for our analysis, there 
is a negative correlation between  growth in value added and the competitiveness measure.  This 
suggests that more-competitive systems may be worse in fostering growth.  The concentration 
index is not (statistically) significantly correlated with the competitiveness measure.  Using a 
larger sample and controlling for some other country factors, CL found this relationship to be 
statistically significant and positive, in contrast to the belief that more-concentrated financial 
systems are less competitive.  The concentration measure is, however, significant negatively 
correlated with growth in value added, suggesting that more concentrated systems are less 
conducive to growth.  There is also a positive relation between the development of the financial 
system and its level of competitiveness. These results indicate that analyzing the effects of 
competition, financial development, and banking system structure on the level of external 
financing available and growth could well amount to different exercises.  These raw correlations 
do not, however, control for other country characteristics.   
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capitalization Concentration Competition 
Growth 1      
         
Share in value added  -0.132 1       
  (0.000)     
Financial  dependence  0.071 -0.074 1   
  (0.013) (0.008)    
Total capitalization  0.080 0.016 -0.002 1   
  (0.005) (0.568) (0.938)   
Concentration -0.104 0.058 0.007 0.021 1 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.806) (0.431)   
Competition -0.131 0.152 0.001 0.139 0.042 1
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.982) (0.001) (0.313) 
 
 
Note: This table reports the correlation matrix of the main regression variables. p-values of significance tests are reported in parentheses below the correlation 
coefficients. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1.  22
4. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
  The regression results are presented in this section.  In the first set of regressions, the 
dependent variable is the average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector in 
a particular country over the period 1980 to 1990, with one observation per sector in each 
country.  We first discuss the basic regression specifications, which are estimated using OLS.  
Industry dummies and country dummies (not reported) are used in all regressions.  The basic 
results are presented in Table 4. The sample varies:  In the first two regressions, without the 
competitiveness measure, we use 41 countries to replicate (as closely as possible) the RZ and CG 
results;
9 for the other regressions, when we use the competitiveness measure, we have 16 
countries.   
 
The industry’s market share in total manufacturing in a specific country has a negative 
sign in all regressions (columns 1 – 7), in line with RZ, suggesting that there is convergence in 
growth across industries.  In terms of the original RZ hypothesis, we find that industrial sectors 
that rely relatively more on external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with 
better-developed financial markets because the coefficient for the interactive variable (total 
capitalization/GDP times external financial dependence) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level (column 1).  Hence, consistent with the findings of RZ, we find that financial 
development facilitates economic growth through greater availability of external financing.  
                                                 
9 Our regression coefficients are not exactly identical to those reported by RZ because they include domestic credit 
to the public sector in their measure of financial development (total capitalization), whereas we include only private 
credit.   23
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Share in value added  -0.926***  -0.829***  -0.412** -0.290*  -0.346** -0.442** -0.442** 
  (0.245) (0.246) (0.173) (0.164) (0.173) (0.178) (0.179) 
Total capitalization · Financial dependence  0.071***    0.053***      0.047***  0.047*** 
  (0.021)   (0.017)    (0.016)  (0.016) 
Concentration  ·  Financial  dependence   0.015   -0.057    -0.002 
   (0.044)   (0.044)    (0.042) 
Competition  ·  Financial  dependence     0.144***  0.120**  0.120** 
      (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
         
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1217  1217  531 531 531 531 531 
Number  of  countries  41 41 16 16 16 16 16 
R
2  0.29 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1990. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include industry and 
country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  24
In terms of the effect of banking system concentration, we find no statistically significant 
effect of the interaction between banking system concentration and financial dependence on 
growth in value added.  This contrasts with Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) who do find that 
more-concentrated banking systems have higher growth in value added for financially dependent 
firms.  The difference may be due to the sample of countries covered.  Also, in their analysis 
they focus on the external financing needs of young firms (less than ten years old), whereas we 
study the relation between growth and financial dependence of all firms. To compare the results 
when we use the banking system competitiveness variable, we next perform the same first two 
regressions on the smaller sample for which we also have the competitiveness measure (columns 
3 and 4).  We find that the results are maintained: financial development improves the growth of 
more financially dependent sectors, while the interaction between banking system concentration 
and financial dependence is not significantly related to growth. 
 
We next introduce our competitiveness measure. We find that industrial sectors using 
relatively more external financing develop faster in countries with more competitive banking 
systems, since the coefficient for the variable financial dependence interacted with the 
competitiveness measure is statistically significant and positive (column 5).  Hence, more 
competition in the banking system facilitates the economic growth of those industries that are 
more dependent on external financing.  These results do not support the view that market power 
is good for external financially dependent sectors when a more complete measure of competition 
is used.   
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The competition effect on growth appears to be in addition to the increase in firm growth 
due to greater external financing availability.  This is because in the regressions where both the 
interaction variables—external financial dependence with financial development and external 
financial dependence with the competitiveness measure—are included (column 6), both 
interactive variables are significantly positive.  Furthermore, when also including the interaction 
variable external financial dependence with concentration, we find that the coefficient on the 
concentration measure is not statistically significant, but the other two remain so (column 7).  
The coefficients of the financial development and competitiveness variables are actually of 
similar magnitudes in regression 6 and 7, as in the earlier regressions for the same sample 
(columns 3 and 5), which supports the robustness of our results.   
 
To interpret these results, we need to consider the size of the coefficients and the average 
values of the financial development and competition variables.  We first use the regression 
estimates to infer the differential impact of financial sector development on growth of a 
financially dependent industry in two countries that differ in their level of financial development.  
(In all these calculations, we set the industry’s share in value added at its overall mean.)  If we 
take one industry at the 75th percentile of external financial dependence shipbuilding and 
repairing,  (e.g., with an external financial dependence of 0.46) and another industry that is at the 
25th percentile (manufacture of other non metallic mineral products, with an external financial 
dependence of 0.06), then it follows from the regression results presented in Table 4 (column 3) 
that the difference in growth rates between these industries is 1.2 percentage points higher in 
Spain, a country that is at the 75th percentile of financial development (with total capitalization 
of 0.85) than in Pakistan, a country at the 25th percentile of financial development (with total   26
capitalization of 0.28). In other words, in terms of growth, moving from Pakistan to (more 
financially developed) Spain benefits highly financially dependent industries more.  
 
We next analyze the effects of a different degree of competition in the financial system.   
We again compare an industry at the 75th percentile of financial dependence, shipbuilding and 
repairing, with one at the 25th percentile, manufacture of other non metallic mineral products.  
Using the OLS regression results presented in Table 4 (column 5), we find that the difference in 
growth between these industries is 1.2 percentage points higher in Sweden, a country at the 75th 
percentile of degree of competition (with an H-statistic of 0.82) than in India, a country at the 
25th percentile of degree of competition (with an H-statistic of 0.61).  In other words, in terms of 
growth, moving from India to (more competitive) Sweden again benefits highly financially 
dependent industries more. Since the average growth in real value added is 3.5% these effects are 
substantial.  It is important to observe that, the effects of financial development and competition 
on growth are of similar magnitude. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS  TESTS 
 
We next conduct a number of robustness tests.  We start by using a different sample 
period.   In the basic test, we use the same time period for growth in value added as in RZ, 
1980—1990. However, the data from which we estimated the banking system competition 
measures covered the 1987—1996 period and thus do not exactly coincide with the period of our 
dependent variable (1980—1990).  We also have growth data over the period 1980—1997,
10 
which provides for a larger overlap with the period for which we estimate the degree of banking 
                                                 
10 We extend the growth rates into the 1990s using data from the UNIDO database, the same source used in RZ.   27
competition. But over a longer period, other factors can affect growth, and the degree of 
competition may change over time.
11  Using the same regressions as before, the results using the 
1980—1997 data are reported in Table 5.   
 
The results are very similar to those reported in Table 4, with greater financial 
development and more banking system competition each exerting a positive effect on sectoral 
growth in all regression specifications, and with coefficients of similar magnitude.  Banking 
system concentration remains insignificant in all specifications. 
 
 
                                                 
11 We checked the stability of the competition measure over time by splitting the sample period for which 
competition was estimated into two equal periods, 1987—1991 and 1992—1996.  See Appendix Table III for the 
specific measures.  We find a high correlation between the competition measures estimated for each period, 0.81, 
and strong correlations between the competition measures estimated for each period and the degree of competition 
for the whole period, 0.85 for the first and 0.99 for the second period.  We also find no obvious trend, as the average 
competition measure for the first period is 0.75 and for the second period is 0.71, while the overall average is 0.72.   
We do not resort to using the H-statistic estimates for the period 1987—1991 because these estimates are available 
for eight countries only; we require a sample of at least 20 bank-year observations for each country in order to 
estimate H.   28




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Share in value added  -0.794***  -0.724***  -0.252 -0.155 -0.197 -0.274*  -0.271* 
  (0.249) (0.249) (0.158) (0.151) (0.158) (0.163) (0.163) 
Total capitalization · Financial dependence  0.053***    0.042***      0.038***  0.037*** 
  (0.019)   (0.015)    (0.014)  (0.014) 
Concentration  ·  Financial  dependence   -0.003   -0.054    -0.013 
   (0.035)   (0.043)    (0.040) 
Competition  ·  Financial  dependence      0.105**  0.085**  0.084** 
      (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
         
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1217  1217  531 531 531 531 531 
Number  of  countries  41 41 16 16 16 16 16 
R
2  0.30 0.29 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1997, when available. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include 
industry and country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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As a subsequent robustness test, we investigate two issues: whether our specific measure 
of financial sector development affects the results; and whether the financial sector development 
measure is a proxy for other aspects of countries’ institutional development.  So far, we have 
used total capitalization—the sum of private credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to 
GDP—as of the beginning of the period, 1980.  We now use its subcomponents, private credit 
and stock market capitalization, both as of 1980.  In addition, we use market capitalization as of 
the end of the period, 1990.  This way, we investigate whether the orientation of the countries’ 
financial system toward banking intermediation or markets affects the results and whether 
financial sector development throughout the period, or rather initial development, is more 
important.   
 
Table 6 (columns 1—3) presents these results.  We find that the interaction between 
private credit to GDP and external financial dependence in 1980 is not statistically significant, 
whereas the interactions between market capitalization to GDP in 1980 and external financial 
dependence and between market capitalization in 1990 and external financial dependence are 
both statistically significant and are both positive.  We emphasize that the interaction between 
our competition measure and financial dependence remains statistically significant and positive 
in all three regressions.  These results confirm that competition in the banking system matters for 
improved access to all forms of external financing (including from nonbanks), regardless of 
whether we control for the development of private credit markets or of stock markets.   
Furthermore, it shows that the results are indifferent to the particular time at which financial 
sector development is measured.
12 
                                                 
12 We also used the average ratios of private credit and stock market capitalization over the 1980—1990 period and 
found similar results.   30




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share  in  value  added  -0.373** -0.438** -0.409** -0.379** -0.442** 
  (0.172) (0.179) (0.176) (0.173) (0.178) 
Private credit in 1980 · Financial dependence  0.059         
  (0.038)      
Market capitalization in 1980 · Financial dependence    0.058***       
   (0.020)     
Market capitalization in 1990 · Financial dependence      0.001***     
    (0.000)    
Total capitalization in 1980 · Financial dependence        0.043**  0.049** 
     (0.018)  (0.021) 
Competition · Financial dependence  0.101*  0.157***  0.111**  0.109*  0.124** 
  (0.061) (0.052) (0.048) (0.057) (0.063) 
Accounting standards · Financial dependence        0.082   
     (0.059)   
Property  rights  ·  Financial  dependence      -0.002 
      ( 0 . 0 1 1 )  
       
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  531 531 531 390 531 
Number  of  countries  16 16 16 12 16 
R
2  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.40 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1990. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include industry and 
country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  31
We next investigate whether the results may reflect factors other than financial sector 
development.  It could be that the particular combination of greater financial sector development, 
more competition, and higher sectoral growth is more likely in countries that are institutionally 
or otherwise better developed in ways that correlate with our competition measure (note that the 
regressions include country dummies, thus controlling for any other country differences).  The 
regression results so far could then lead to the incorrect conclusion that it is financial sector 
development and competition rather than other forms of (institutional) development that drive 
growth.  It is difficult to control for all forms of such development that might be correlated with 
competition, but two logical candidates to investigate are the quality of financial information and 
the level of protection of property rights in the country—factors that have been found to be 
closely associated with financial sector development and growth.  The former, as measured by an 
index of the quality of accounting standards, is a useful robustness measure because it reflects 
the potential for obtaining finance, rather than actual finance raised, and refers not just to the 
banking system and stock market as a source of financing but to all forms of external financing.  
Specifically, RZ argue that “the higher the standards of financial disclosure in the country, the 
easier it will be for firms to raise funds from a wider circle of investors.” The accounting 
standards index has been shown by RZ to have a statistically significant positive correlation to 
growth when interacted with financial dependence.  The other institutional development 
indicator, an index of the degree to which property rights are perceived to be enforced in the 
country, has been found by a number of authors to matter for financial sector development and 
growth (see e.g. Beck et al. 2000).  
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We interact these two indexes with sectoral external financial dependence and include 
them one by one in our regressions.  We keep in the regression our standard measure of financial 
sector development (stock market capitalization) interacted with external financial dependence. 
We find that the interactions of the accounting and property rights indexes with financial 
dependence themselves are not statistically significant (Table 6, columns 4 and 5).  The 
interactions between total capitalization and financial dependence remain statistically significant 
and positive.  Our main result—on the importance of competition for enhancing the growth of 
financially dependent industries—is not affected, since the interaction variable between 
competition and external financial dependence remains statistically significant and positive.  This 
suggests that the finding that industries with greater financial dependence benefit in growth 
terms from greater competition in the financial system is not due to a better quality of financial 
information or improved property rights. 
 
Although endogeneity (or omitted variables) should not be a major concern given the RZ 
methodology, as a second robustness test we use instrumental variables to control for the 
possible (residual) endogeneity of some variables.  Because we have a limited number of 
instrumental variables, we are restricted in the actual number of independent variables that we 
can include at the same time.  We therefore run the instrumental variables only with (a) the 
interaction between financial development and external financial dependence or (b) the 
interaction between the competition measure and external financial dependence.  However, we 
do vary the specific measure of financial sector development and use, besides total capitalization, 
the quality of the country’s accounting standards as measured in 1983. 
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The results of this robustness test—where we use the country’s legal origin as instrument, 
as is commonly done—are reported in Table 7.  The instrumental variables (IV) regression 
results, presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, basically confirm (for the original sample of 
countries) the RZ finding that financially dependent firms grow faster in more-developed 
financial systems, although the effect is statistically significant only when financial development 
is measured by the accounting standards index.  We confirm these effects for the smaller set of 
countries for which we also have the competition measure (columns 3 and 4).  Although the total 
capitalization interaction term is now statistically significant, the accounting interaction term is 
not.  When we next use the legal origin as instrument for the competition variable, we find again 
that firms that are more financially dependent grow faster in financial systems that are more 
competitive, suggesting that the results do not suffer from possible endogeneity problems 
(column 5). 
 
We can again provide the economic effects of these results, setting each industry’s share 
in value added at its overall mean.  If we again take the industry at the 75th percentile of external 
financial dependence (ship building and repairing) and the industry at the 25th percentile of 
external financial dependence (manufacture of other nonmetallic mineral products), then it 
follows from the IV regression results presented in Table 7 (column 5) that the difference in 
growth between these industries is 1.6 percentage points higher in Sweden, a country at the 75th 
percentile of competition (with a H-statistic of 0.82) than in India, a country at the 25th 
percentile of competition (with a H-statistic of 0.61).  This is, again, a large difference compared 
to the average annual growth in real value added of 3.5%.   34
Table 7:  Instrumental variables. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share in value added  -0.842***  -0.338***  -0.410**  -0.229*  -0.363** 
  (0.241) (0.118) (0.174) (0.138) (0.174) 
Total capitalization · Financial dependence  0.008    0.052*     
  (0.037)   (0.031)    
Accounting standards · Financial dependence    0.150***    0.021   
   (0.056)   (0.070)   
Competition  ·  Financial  dependence      0.192*** 
      ( 0 . 0 6 7 )  
       
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1217  830 531 390 531 
Number  of  countries  41 27 16 12 16 
R
2  0.28 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.39 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1990. Regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include 
industry and country dummies (not reported). As instrument for total capitalization and competition we use the legal origin dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   35
 
As a subsequent robustness test, we investigate whether our estimating the measure of 
competition with error affects our results.  We do this in two ways.  First, we perform weighted 
least-squares regressions using the inverse of the standard deviation of our competition measure 
as weights. Second, we still use OLS regressions but use the rank order of the competition 
measure rather than the competition variable itself as an independent variable (with the country 
with the lowest H-statistic having rank 1; see also Appendix Table II).  Results are reported in 
Table 8, where we first replicate the core regression, as already reported in Table 4 (column 1).  
The next result using weighted regression shows that the error in the H-measure does not affect 
the magnitude of the coefficient for the competition measure (column 2).  Neither does using the 
rank order alter the finding that more competitive banking systems lead to higher growth in 
financially dependent industries (column 3).  Although (as expected) the coefficient in the last 
regression changes in magnitude, it does not change in terms of statistical significance. 
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Table 8:  Estimation error of H-statistics. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Share in value added  -0.346**  -0.427*  -0.344** 
  (0.173) (0.223) (0.173) 
Competition · Financial dependence  0.144***  0.146***   
  (0.051) (0.056)  
Competition Rank · Financial dependence      0.005*** 
    (0.002) 
     
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 531  531  531 
Number  of  countries  16 16 16 
R
2  0.39 0.39 0.39 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1990. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include industry and 
country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1.  In column (2) we use the 
inverse of the standard deviation of H as weight. In column (3) we use the rank of the H-statistic (where the country with the lowest H-statistic has rank 1) 
instead of the H-statistic as competition variable. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  37
In a subsequent and last set of regressions, we test whether the results thus far capture 
other factors that drive sectoral growth across countries.  Fisman and Love (2004; hereafter FL) 
have argued that it is not financial development but rather the presence of growth opportunities 
that drives the differences in actual growth rates of industries across countries.  In their view, 
other factors (which happen to be correlated with financial development) determine growth 
opportunities across countries and so the RZ regression results simply reflect that countries with 
greater financial development also have a better ability to make use of such growth 
opportunities.  It could be the same for competition: perhaps it is not a more-competitive banking 
system that provides more or better financing for industries that are financially dependent  but 
rather the presence of growth opportunities, which happen to be correlated with greater 
competition, that allow financially dependent firms to grow faster.  In this robustness test we 
therefore include, as FL did, the interaction between the actual sales growth rates of benchmark 
U.S. firms over the 1980—1990 period (using data from FL) with our competition measure.  To 
assure comparability, we also re-run, for our sample of countries, the FL specification with 
financial development and growth opportunities.  Table 9 reports the regression results. 
 
The first regression result replicates the FL results (for the larger sample of 41 countries): 
including the measure of growth opportunities interacted with financial development is 
statistically significant and, importantly, after including this interaction term the interaction 
variable between financial development and external financial dependence is no longer 
statistically significant (column 1).  When we next include the interaction between our 
competition measure and financial dependence (for the smaller sample of 16 countries), we find 
this interaction to be significant, while the financial development and growth opportunities   38
interaction term remains significant and the external financial dependence interaction term is 
again not significant (column 2).  A more competitive banking system thus allows financially 
dependent industries to grow faster, even controlling for growth opportunities and general 
financial sector development.   
 
We next confirm this result by excluding from the regression the interaction term 
between financial development and external financial dependence.  We find no differences in the 
coefficients (in size and statistical significance) for the interaction terms financial development 
with growth opportunities or the competition measure with financial dependence (column 3).  
Finally, we apply the same logic as FL did for financial development to the competition variable: 
it could be that a more competitive system is not important for industries that have more need for 
external financing but rather for industries that have more growth opportunities (and then may 
need more external financing).  We find that the measure of growth opportunities interacted with 
the competition measure is not statistically significant, whereas the interaction between 
competition and financial dependence remains statistically significant (column 4). This confirms 
that a more-competitive banking system provides external financially dependent firms with more 
and better access to financing, thereby allowing them to grow faster.   39




  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share in value added  -0.927***  -0.454**  -0.445**  -0.345** 
  (0.247) (0.178) (0.173) (0.174) 
Total capitalization · Financial dependence  0.029  0.009     
 (0.023)  (0.023)     
Total capitalization · Growth opportunities  0.703**  0.624*  0.698***   
  (0.345) (0.343) (0.248)  
Competition · Financial dependence    0.120**  0.123**  0.132* 
   (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.076) 
Competition · Growth opportunities        0.207 
     (0.990) 
      
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1217  531  531  531 
Number  of  countries  41 16 16 16 
R
2  0.30 0.40 0.40 0.39 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is real growth in sectoral value added over the period 1980—1990.  Regressions are estimated using OLS and include industry and 
country dummies (not reported).  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1.  Growth opportunities is 
sales growth at the industry level in the U.S. from Fisman and Love (2004). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  40
6.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Using a large cross-section of countries, we relate a structural measure of banking system 
competitiveness to industrial growth.  We find that external financially dependent sectors grow 
faster in more-competitive banking systems.  This relationship controls for the effects of overall 
financial sector development on the growth of external financially dependent industries, does not 
depend on the particular measure of financial sector development used, and is robust to the 
possibility of differences in growth opportunities driving results and to conducting a number of 
other sensitivity tests.  We find no evidence that market structure—that is, concentration in the 
banking system—helps predict industrial sector growth.  We conclude that there is no support for 
the view that market power is good for access to financing. The findings suggest that the degree 
of competition is an important aspect of financial sector development and, in turn, economic 
growth. 
 
These findings do not, however, give insights on all the channels through which 
increased competition may affect the role of the financial sector in fostering growth.  In 
particular, we did not investigate across countries the relationship between direct measures of the 
cost of financial intermediation, such as net interest margins, and our measure of competition 
(although that does capture the degree to which banks pass input costs on to output costs).  We 
also did not investigate the relationship between direct measures of firms’ access to external 
financing—such as the reported difficulty in obtaining external financing or the degree of other 
external financing constraints—and our measure of competition.   
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We did not explore all other possible measures of countries’ characteristics, including 
institutional aspects, that may explain this effect.  It is possible, for example, that factors other 
than the degree of informational opaqueness and the protection of property rights can explain 
both a low level of effective competition and why limited competition hurts access to financing.  
Although this type of omitted variable problem is reduced given our specification, we cannot 
eliminate the possibility that omitted variables drive some of the results.  Nevertheless, our 
results shed some important light on how competition can affect access to external financing.     42
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Appendix Table I: Country -Averages of the Main Regression Variables. 
Country Growth  Total  capitalization  Concentration  Competition 
Australia 0.0222  0.6606  0.60  0.80 
Austria 0.0394  0.7943  0.42 0.81 
Bangladesh 0.0492  0.0704  0.62   
Belgium -0.0018  0.3805  0.49   
Brazil 0.0373  0.2783  0.40   
Canada 0.0283 0.9056  0.57 0.62 
Chile 0.0576  0.7013  0.45  
Colombia 0.0345  0.1965  0.35   
Costa Rica  0.0593  0.2961  0.71   
Denmark 0.0205  0.5060  0.74   
Egypt 0.0952  0.2197  0.58  0.46 
Finland 0.0238 0.5419  0.85   
France 0.0236  0.6435 0.28   
Germany 0.0379  0.8734  0.27  0.81 
Greece 0.0178  0.5162 0.79   
India 0.0684  0.2927  0.40  0.61 
Israel 0.0219  1.0183  0.79  
Italy 0.0072  0.4877  0.24   
Japan 0.0652  1.1581  0.21  
Jordan 0.0839  1.0384 0.87   
Kenya 0.0183  0.2044 0.59   
Korea 0.1347  0.5753  0.28   
Malaysia 0.0937  1.1386  0.44  0.84 
Mexico -0.0307 0.2324  0.53 0.75 
Morocco 0.0846  0.1812  0.57   
Netherlands -0.0095  0.7969  0.77  1.01 
New Zealand  0.0239  0.5186  0.75   
Norway -0.0010 0.4011  0.60  0.91 
Pakistan 0.0738  0.2802  0.71  0.61 
Peru -0.0341  0.1658  0.64  0.53 
Philippines -0.0077  0.3780  0.40   
Portugal 0.0127  0.5259  0.46   
Singapore 0.0857  2.1903  0.61  0.56 
South Africa  0.0176  1.4629  0.69   
Spain 0.0169  0.8480  0.34  
Sri Lanka  -0.0221  0.2718  0.75   
Sweden 0.0138 0.5261  0.71 0.82 
Turkey 0.1194  0.1499  0.41   
U.K. 0.0105  0.6296  0.50  0.65 
Venezuela -0.0228  0.3512  0.47  0.69 
Zimbabwe 0.0196  0.7489  0.78   
Total 0.0349  0.5803  0.55  0.72 
Notes: Growth is real growth in sectoral value added for the period 1980—1990. Total capitalization is private credit 
plus stock market capitalization to GDP in 1980. Concentration is the three-bank concentration ratio for the period 
1989—1996. Competition is the average H-statistic for the period 1987—1996. Definitions and data sources of the 
variables are in Table 1.   47
 
Appendix Table II: H-statistic estimates and statistical significance. 
 
Country  H-statistic 
St. dev. of H-
statistic 
p-value of test 
with H0: H=1 
p-value of test 
with H0: H=0 
Rank order of H-
statistic 
Egypt  0.46 0.05 0.00 0.00  1 
Peru  0.53 0.12 0.00 0.00  2 
Singapore  0.56 0.04 0.00 0.00  3 
India 0.61 0.04 0.00 0.00  4 
Pakistan  0.61 0.10 0.00 0.00  5 
Canada  0.62 0.04 0.00 0.00  6 
U.K. 0.65 0.06 0.00 0.00  7 
Venezuela  0.69 0.09 0.00 0.00  8 
Mexico  0.75 0.04 0.00 0.00  9 
Australia  0.80 0.05 0.00 0.00  10 
Austria  0.81 0.04 0.00 0.00  11 
Germany  0.81 0.04 0.00 0.00  12 
Sweden  0.82 0.02 0.00 0.00  13 
Malaysia  0.84 0.02 0.00 0.00  14 
Norway  0.91 0.05 0.04 0.00  15 
Netherlands  1.01 0.05 0.82 0.00  16 
Average  0.72 0.06 0.05 0.00   
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Appendix Table III: Stability of H-statistic 
 
Country  H (1987—1996)  H1 (1987-1991)  H2 (1992-1996) 
Australia  0.80 0.75 0.83 
Austria 0.81    
Canada  0.62 0.63 0.62 
Egypt 0.46    0.44 
Germany  0.81 0.89 0.81 
India  0.61 0.59 0.60 
Malaysia  0.84 0.74 0.86 
Mexico  0.75 0.70 0.71 
Netherlands 1.01    1.01 
Norway  0.91 0.92 0.92 
Pakistan 0.61    0.61 
Peru 0.53    0.52 
Singapore 0.56    0.55 
Sweden 0.82    0.80 
UK 0.65    0.66 
Venezuela  0.69 0.78 0.67 
Total  0.72 0.75 0.71 
 
Notes: H is the average H-statistic for the period 1987—1996, H1 is the average H-statistic for the period 1987—
1991, and H2 is the average H-statistic for the period 1992—1996. We estimate the H-statistic only for countries 
and periods that have more than 20 country-year observations. 
 
 
 